Torture the Ticking Bomb Terrorist?

A CRITICAL RESPONSE

to

Alan M. Dershowitz’s Should the Ticking Bomb Terrorist be Tortured?

It seems that Dershowitz’s justification of torture is largely founded on the notion that if we are to embrace our general belief that civil liberties may be forgone in certain circumstances to preserve public safety, then this should also apply to instances where torture is necessary, despite our instinctual aversion to torture. While he effectively contrasts these two intuitions, it is not so convincing why it is the latter that ought to be abandoned. 

His comparison of torturing the ticking bomb terrorist with the shooting of a fleeing felon fails to recognize the differing objectives of violence and their implications. Shooting the fleeing felon is a direct counteraction to the threat he demonstrably poses in his current state. The terrorist, having been arrested and now being held in custody, poses no such threat that can be thwarted by a force against him. Violence directed towards the terrorist in the “ticking bomb scenario” is coercive rather than defensive. This poses a problematic disparity, as for the fleeing felon to be spared he must only stop and surrender, whereas the terrorist’s fate relies on his knowledge - which we cannot be certain that he possesses. Though it may betray the parameters of the hypothetical, we must consider the case where the terrorist actually does not know where the bomb is (him being innocent, suffering amnesia, etc. are possibilities in the real world, the same one that Dershowitz often relates to), and thus must either lie or be doomed to prolonged agony and potentially lasting psychological trauma. While Dershowitz criticizes case utilitarian arguments for lacking an “inherently limiting principle”, it is unclear under his analysis what would limit the torture when the desired information does not or cannot come forward. At what point does it end? When violent force is used to entice one to perform an action (such as providing information), unlike when it is used stop or prevent performing one (such as in the case of a fleeing felon), those who lack the ability to perform said action have no legitimate means to avoid it. 

Asking whether we may justify torturing a terrorist who knows the location of a bomb is akin to asking “Is it justifiable to sentence the death penalty to a murderer we know is guilty?” While it may be in that instance, absolute certainty is rare, and allowing it then establishes a dangerous precedent (that has actually resulted in many wrongful executions). And while torture is of a lesser magnitude than execution, we should reasonably expect a far greater degree of uncertainty that the ticking bomb terrorist has been correctly identified than the death row candidate. Given that wrongful executions have occurred following a trial and years of appeal processes, surely the margin of error would be dramatically increased in an extremely time sensitive “ticking bomb” scenario, for which Dershowitz’s contends a mere warrant should be sufficient.

NEWCOMBS’ PROBLEM in light of CAUSALITY

CONNOR DENNEHY WORD COUNT: 1879
 
NEWCOMB'S PARADOX in light of CAUSALITY
 
Introduction

Imagine that you are playing a game in which you are presented with two boxes. One is uncovered, visibly containing one thousand dollars; the other is covered, and is known to contain either a million dollars or nothing. You are given the options of taking both, or just the covered. The contents of the covered box depend upon a prediction made by a mysterious Being, regarding which option you will choose. If the Being predicted that you will take both boxes, then the covered box will empty, and if the Being predicted that you will take only the covered box, then it will contain the million dollars. Additionally, it is understood that this Being has impeccable predictive powers, demonstrated by having made a virtually infinite number of accurate predictions for this very game, without one single mistake. In other words, you have every reason to believe that the Being had anticipated you choice correctly. With this in mind, and assuming your goal is to obtain the most money possible, which of the two options do you choose?
 
This thought experiment, devised by theoretical physicist William Newcomb in 1960 and later dubbed “Newcomb’s Paradox”, can be regarded as one of the most enduring problems of decision theory, as it continues to be a source of mass dispute amongst the academic philosophy community (The Worlds of David Darling). That may not be so remarkable however, when considering the elusive nature of the problem. Quite apparently, the narrative of the paradox fails to describe with any explicitness its aspects that are most essential in the determination of a solution; namely the processes that drive the Beings prediction and your final choice, or the degree to which they are dependent on each other. Anyone attempting to solve the problem has the burden of first “filling in the blanks” as it were, based on their own perceptual intuitions, before deciding upon and employing their strategy. Thus, the disparities with regards to the problem do not arise merely from computational differences, but largely interpretational, and so it unsurprising that no consensus has been reached. In this essay, I shall attempt to provide a coherent account for the events contained in the problem and define their parameters in an artless fashion. In doing so, I believe the solution will become obvious. That is, in order to obtain the million dollars it is effectively necessary to take only the covered box.

Main Argument

It appears that the true essence of this problem lies within the relationship that exists between the Beings prediction and your choice, for is it the contours of this framework that govern how you can manoeuvre. For instance, if it is the case that the prediction causes your choice then it is better that you take only the covered box, though your decision is already determined. Conversely, if your choice somehow manifests the respective prediction via backwards causality, then to obtain the million dollars you then again must take only the covered box. Furthermore, suppose that there is no dependence between these events whatsoever, and that the Beings track record is simply the result of an extraordinary number of lucky guesses. In this case, you would of course be wise to take the both boxes in hopes of obtaining the extra $1000, as there is no reason for his streak to continue. None of these scenarios are appealing however, because not only do they border on inconceivable, they also render the problem utterly meaningless, leaving you the player totally confined to either option. Once we reject these premises however, a series of logical assumptions can be made that lead us to gain insight into the solution. Firstly, that prior to the Beings making of his prediction, he in some way can perceive who the next player is. This access to perception is crucial, as without it the Being would have no basis for estimating the future actions of each specific player. Secondly, that given his exceptional success rate, the Being must have some additional information and method which he can use in conjunction with said identity information to make an inference (and likely a highly warranted one at that!). At this point it seems quite reasonable to compare the Beings strategy to that of a meteorologist. Just as a meteorologist makes calculations based on current weather data and additional knowledge of natural laws to predict future conditions, the Being might perform a similar kind of forecast using knowledge of your earlier state of existence with other relevant natural laws that govern human behaviour. While I do not wish to reject all notions of free will, you the player are likely not as free as you may think you are in the moment of making your choice. For if one truly had the ability to arrive at decisions completely independent of prior causes, and then his predictions simply could not have been made with accuracy they displayed. Just as if blizzards could occur in mid-august regardless of context or natural laws then every meteorogists would be out of a job. This is not the case however, as experts in the field can generally foresee weather related events with functional accuracy. And when expected weather events do come to fruition, it is for many of the same reasons the prediction was made, i.e. specific prior conditions of the area subjected to natural laws over time. Similarly, you at the moment of your choosing are no doubt influenced significantly (if not entirely), by your earlier state and subsequent interactions resulting from natural laws, both of which must have been accounted for in the Beings estimation. Even if the Being is not consciously aware of his reasons, he must perceive these factors in some way. Thus, it can be said that the Beings prediction and your choice do not cause each other, but rather they share common causes, so much so that it is overwhelmingly likely that they correlate. While it is rarely stated in plain terms, it should be noted that the only way to formulate an effective hypothesis is to take into account the causal factors for the event. Evidently, the Being has mastered this practice.

Motivation/ Objections

Robert Nozick, his 1969 paper Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice, provided the first published analysis of the paradox. In it, he relentlessly tackles the problem for some 21 pages before arriving at his conclusion “I believe one should take what is in both boxes” (Nozick 135). Since Nozick’s paper
is so quintessential, and he happens to hold a view opposing my own, I would like to expose some potential flaws in his theses.

Following his introduction, Nozick summarizes what he considers to be the most intuitive arguments for either choice. For the two box option, he contends that since the Being has already made its prediction, the contents of the covered box are already determined and not subject to change given your choice, so you are prudent to take the additional $1000 which is guaranteed (Nozick 115). While the extra cash is certainly alluring, what this theory fails to recognize is that the Being would almost certainly have predicted this, and thus you will likely receive no more than $1000. He then supposes a situation in which another person is sitting behind the covered box, and can see into it as its back side is transparent (p. 116.). While this person cannot express their advice to you, he states that in either case that the person would suggest taking both boxes (Nozick 116). Again, this completely flies in the face of the parameters set by the game. If this person could give their instruction in any way, surely the Being could account for this (as it is included in your decision), and thus it can be expected that he or she will be looking into an empty box.

Nozick then spends a large portion of his paper comparing Newcomb’s Paradox to other problems that involve weighing the dominance principle, where one chooses their action solely based on highest utility (both box solution), against the expected utility principle, where one chooses the action which has the highest expected utility given the probabilities of what state you are in (one box solution). Generally, he agrees that in cases where states are probabilistically dependent on actions, one should not apply the dominance principle (Nozick, 124). However, in what appears to be his most compelling argument, Nozick changes his mind. He envisions a scenario in which a man is faced with the decision of whether or not to pursue his ideal life in academia when it is known that if he has the gene that prompts academic inclination, then it is likely he also is predisposed to a terminal illness (Nozick 125). Here, while the states are clearly not independent, Nozick challenges using the expected utility principle, because the man’s having the predisposition or not is already determined and so avoiding academic pursuit will not prevent him from said terminal illness (Nozick 126). While I do not have an answer for this problem, I can say that it differs significantly from Newcombs’ Paradox as it does not involve the element of prediction. Once the man becomes aware of his predicament, his willingness to pursue academia is now polluted, which could not have been foreseen by the disease. The event of this man avoiding further education yet still dying prematurely seems much more probable then than you deciding to take only the covered box and it being empty.
 
Furthermore, Nozick contends the following: 
"Your deciding to do as you do is not part of the explanation of why he makes   the prediction he does, though your being in a certain state earlier, is part of the explanation of why he makes the prediction he does, and why you decide to do as you do.” (Nozick 134)

This, perhaps inadvertently, confirms the very argument I made previously. Yes, your choice and the beings prediction share common causes, so much so that they are likely to correlate. Of course, your decision itself is not part the Beings estimate, for it is the very event that he is trying to predict! Your prior state of existence however, combined with relevant external forces, does inform his prediction, as well as your choice. Apparently Nozick believes that with enough consideration, you may somehow break free of prior causality. This I believe is the very misstep in thinking that makes problems like Newcomb’s Paradox seem much more intriguing than they actually are if you are willing to forfeit privacy of your mind.

Conclusion:

Ultimately, it appears that Newcomb’s Paradox is particularly troublesome for many people as it requires one to accept the causality that influences their decisions. This persistent temptation to take both boxes is largely predicated on the belief that not even a hypothetical Being with seemingly infinite knowledge and ability could anticipate the actions arising from your conscious thoughts. While I am reluctant to say ones choice in this problem is entirely deterministic, it appears that within the context of this problem, your choice is significantly circumscribed by causal factors. And so, while the answer is simple and practically guarantees that you receive the million dollars, it is not quite so satisfying as this decision is largely out of your control.

Works Cited (MLA style)
 
“Newcomb’s paradox.” The Worlds of David Darling. n.p, n.d. Web. 20 Nov. 2013.

Nozick. R. Newcomb’s problem and two principles of choice:. Essays in honor of Carl G. Hempel: A Tribute on the Occasion of His Sixty-Fifth Birthday. Ed. Nicholas Rescher. New York; Springer; 1969. 115-146. Print

Twitter Outrage and My Grande Disillusion

As the Internet offers the distinct ability to interact without direct confrontation, how one conducts themselves on it is seemingly without consequence. Or at least this is assumed to be the sentiment shared by those who use its secure vantage point to broadcast hatred and insolence to a potentially limitless audience of groups and individuals who may or may not be deeply offended. Recently, there has arisen a disturbing trend of people, particularly teenagers, using social media platforms such as Twitter to voice their most intolerant and abhorrent of views. This quickly gained attention after a mass of tweets were published around the time of the US Presidential Election that expressed extreme racially-charged vitriol against Barrack Obama. And so, a contrary movement has sprung forth among "Internet vigilantes" whose aim is to expose the offenders and avenge their wrongdoings by use of public shaming. Ostensibly, this measure serves not only as  punishment, but also to prevent the occurrence of further "hate speech" as it were. Responses to this practise, as I have observed in related articles and their respective comment threads, have been largely polarised. While there are many ardent supporters, urging the importance of teens facing repercussions for their online actions, usually informed by some form of "don't dish it out if you cant take it" posture, others strongly disagree, suggesting that their age should permit them to make mistakes and that exposing them will only bring about more aggression. My stance however, may not be as decisive, and is as follows; though I find the public shaming efforts to be wildly misguided, I also see no reason or comprehensible method to protect the teens in question.



One example of the "Tweets" in question

Firstly, it should be noted that the practise of public shaming and humiliation is highly controversial on ethical grounds, and its effectiveness as a deterrent for bad behaviour is dubious as best. Though some studies have shown it to be useful in preventing criminal behaviour among adults, it is almost universally rejected by professionals with regards to being used on children. Even so, there is little grounds for comparison to almost any research on the subject as the circumstances surrounding this issue are so vastly different, to the degree where it begs the question of whether re-circulating racist Tweets can even be classified as such. Traditionally, "public shaming" involves exposing people for committing crimes that they would feel shame for. Quite differently, in these instances the "crimes" being exposed are by nature of their execution, intended for public viewing. Yes, the tweets that are receiving attention on shaming sites and articles were first obtained from publicly accessible Twitter accounts, and thus any notions of privacy invasion can be quickly abandoned.



Typical responses display lack of remorse

 

I actually do think shame is an important and increasingly underused societal tool ('m not even opposed to the "dog poop girl" tactic), but the sheer confidence and steadfastness with which these tweets are delivered suggests a resilience to such application. In the cases I have seen, directly critical replies are met with no visible remorse whatsoever, and its even harder to imagine what little effect the distribution and viewing of said tweets among  a silent, faceless Internet jury would have. And however vile the Tweets may be, I am also somewhat bothered with the fervent efforts put forth by the shamers . As one online commenter so eloquently put it;

“ I can't help suspecting that the business of "shaming" is akin to the same warped impulse that instigates bullying. Nothing justifies hectoring and scolding like the Moral High Ground, and racism is the lazy moralist's platform of choice. ANYTHING done in the service of correcting racism is apparently justified, as though remarks (racist or otherwise) made by teenagers via social media are anything we should take notice of at all."- Semoco, can be accessed in comment thread here

So, perhaps if nothing else, this activity can provide the "shamer" a feeling of semi-satisfaction, knowing that they at at least addressed the issue of racism in some way, though each racist remark in and of its self  may have little bearing on any ones well being. Jezebel, which has been at the forefront of this humiliation campaign, actually contacted the schools of several of the culprits. Among the  schools that did respond, a general displeasure with the tweets was expressed, and some stated that disciplinary actions would be taken.  Though not overly encouraging, one would think this method is more likely to yield actual results. However, when combined with the voyeurist shaming aspect, it sends mixed messages. What are your priorities, Jezebel? And I would ask the same of Matt Binder, creator of the  popular and aptly named tumblr blog Public Shaming, who along with exposing racial hatred and staggering elitism is going after tweets that aren't even particularly offensive, such as those displaying the failure to know when John Lennon died. When exposing real societal issues is accompanied with the relentless desire to simply make fun of the stupidity of others, is the moral intention not blurred?

Is this worthy of public shaming?



 Purveyors of the opposition seem to be just as deluded, however. In the article Hey Internet, Quit Outing Kids for Racism, Slate contributor Emily Bazelon expresses her dismay with public shaming sites and Internet vigilante-ism , quoting fellow Slate journalist Emily Yoffe in saying “these sites are pinning kids like butterflies as permanent racists", and may have a detrimental to their career opportunities. While this remains to be seen, I would argue that to display such complete and utter moral bankruptcy evident in the tweets should bring a negative effect. Furthermore, its hard not to notice the subtle hypocrisy at work. While she stresses the notion of protecting the "kids" from said exposure, the article itself is simply attracting more views to very sites she renounces. The same can be said about Bust magazines Genevieve Bleidner, who in her article entitled Public Shaming Tumblr Outs Internet Assholes: Lose-Lose?  goes as far as to make a comparison to the shaming of Amanda Todd, but then shares the screen shots from Twitter, name and all included, further shedding light on the potential victims of harassment. And apart from writing about it, what possible method is there to thwart this type of retaliation. There is little find a legal basis for intervention, as I have stated previously that these tweets were made public to begin with. Even a site like Hello There, Racists, which compiles personal information about the posters, is only doing so by means of referencing their active Twitter and Facebook accounts. Furthermore, if someone is allowed to voice their opinions, however reprehensible, others should and do have the right to respond by referencing those opinions. Indeed, almost as Newton's third law of motion would dictate, for every action of a racist twitter user, there seems to be an equal and opposite reaction by angry / opportunistic bloggers.

Hey Slate, Quit Outing Kids for Racism

 My bitter rejection of both camps may come across simply as stoic pessimism, but let me assure you otherwise.  While I find most voices within  this uproar to be uninformed and largely inconsequential, I do think the issue at large is one worth discussing, and that course of events that has transpired is one that will only give us more frame of reference for future struggles. My final analysis? Though in varying proportions, the twitter offenders, the vigilantes, and the journalists who criticise them all appear to have common motivator; the incessant need for attention.







-Connor Dennehy